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Use of Depleted Uranium Weapons in 
Contemporary Military Interventions
Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood
This research note examines the use of depleted uranium weapons in contemporary 
military interventions and the hazardous effects of their use. It also demonstrates 
attempts made by the United States and the United Kingdom to block any 
international efforts to ban the use of these weapons. Although there is no laboratory 
evidence, experiential evidence from Iraq indicates that depleted uranium weapons 
are dangerous to human health and the environment. This research note argues that 
the United Nations should play a leading role in seeking a ban on the use of these 
weapons in military interventions.
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Introduction
Although manufactured as early as the 1970s, depleted uranium (DU) weapons 
were first used by the American and British forces in the 1991 Gulf War, 
following the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. DU weapons are made 
from uranium waste, and therefore contain chemically toxic and radioactive 
compounds (Hackman, Hackman, and Hackman 2002, 5-7). The post-war Iraqi 
government has attributed medical problems, particularly increases in cancers 
and genetic mutations in babies born after the war, to the use of DU munitions 
by the United States and the United Kingdom during the Gulf War (Hulme 
2005, 197). Whereas many observers, including academics and international 
organizations, continue to question the authenticity of such claims by the Iraqi 
government, others agree with the Iraqi position, especially those who had 
suspected the use of such weapons during the Balkan military campaigns in the 
1990s (Norton-Taylor 2001).
It seems, therefore, that the extent of the damage done by DU weapons to 
the environment and human health is still a subject of debate. To date, there is no 
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law prohibiting their use in military interventions. Some states have made their 
stance known on the dangers of the use of DU weapons and have called for a ban 
on their use. Others like the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Israel, 
and Japan, who are producers and/or users of such weapons, have continued to 
support their use (Hulme 2005, 269). Yet, they have failed to spearhead cleanup 
exercises in areas where DU munitions were deployed in line with the World 
Health Organization (WHO)’s guidelines, which exhort that, “where possible 
cleanup operations in conflict impact zones should be undertaken” (WHO 2001, 
vi).
In light of this conflicting and complex picture, this research note aims to 
tackle the following controversial issues: reasons for the manufacture and use of 
DU weapons, and their effects on human health and the environment. Also, this 
note reviews the legal framework surrounding the use of DU weapons, and then 
briefly discusses actual use of DU weapons, particularly in the Balkan region. 
Why DU?
The natural isotopes of uranium occur in three different forms: U234, U235, and 
U238. Fissionable U235 accounts for only 0.72%, whilst more than 99% consists 
of unfissionable U238. When the U235 isotope is separated out the waste product 
generated is known as “depleted uranium.” Despite its hazardous and radioactive 
nature, a DU weapon is not itself a nuclear weapon as it is incapable of an atomic 
chain reaction and contains only a minute residual amount of fissionable U235 
(Hulme 2005, 206). Thus, DU is a by-product of the enrichment process used to 
generate fuel for nuclear power or for the production of nuclear weapons. For the 
purpose of this research note, DU weapons will be defined as point weapons that 
are made from nuclear by-products and are designed to impact a specific, distinct 
target (Hulme 2004, 12). 
According to one source, more than 50,000 metric tons of DU are added to 
the already extensive existing stockpiles in the United States, Europe, and Russia 
every year. The total quantity of DU accumulated by both producers and users of 
nuclear energy and weapons across the world now amounts to over 1.2 million 
metric tons (Riley 2004, 36). 
The United States is the major producer of DU weapons. Having completed 
and tested their first nuclear weapon in 1945, U.S. scientists were faced with the 
problem of the accumulation of nuclear by-products. Rather than view DU as 
unused waste that would require costly and possibly dangerous disposal, they 
sought to find uses for DU and, accordingly, championed research on ways of 
accomplishing their aims. They discovered that DU had exceptional properties 
that were very appealing. Most notably they found that, in comparison to other 
metals such as tungsten and lead, DU had much higher density.  Hence they 
 Use of Depleted Uranium Weapons in Contemporary Military Interventions 113
proposed to use it in the production of weapons. The first such weapons were 
successfully manufactured in the 1970s and were first used in the 1991 Gulf War 
(Nobuo 2010, 236; Hulme 2005, 197). 
Why is DU preferred over other metals? First, since uranium is about 2.5 
times heavier than iron and 1.7 times denser than lead, DU munitions have the 
capability of penetrating more deeply and traveling farther than conventional 
munitions. DU is also known to be pyrophoric, which means that it ignites 
spontaneously on contact with the air. As a result of these physical and chemical 
properties, DU is used in the manufacture of weapons intended to penetrate 
armor plate and correspondingly to reinforce military vehicles and tanks (Tyner 
2010, 147). When DU munitions strike a vehicle, for example, they do not 
explode as conventional weapons do; rather, they penetrate into the vehicle, 
cremating all the occupants. DU kinetic energy penetrators are the best-known 
advanced munitions, partly because of the publicity they received after their use 
in the First Gulf War by the coalition forces (McClain and Miller 2007, 2).
One of the reasons why the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) switched 
to the use of DU weapons was the U.S. Navy’s indication that DU was the best 
material available for munitions (Fahey 2008a, 7). This reasoning is based on 
experience during the Gulf and Iraq wars in which DU rounds were said to have 
been instrumental in the U.S. and British military defeat of the Iraqi military, as 
the former’s weapons were more sophisticated and revolutionary compared to 
the latter’s outdated Soviet tanks (Nobuo 2010, 237). This informed the use of DU 
weapons by the United States during their military intervention in the Balkan 
States between 1994 and 1995, the Iraqi war in 2003, and the Afghan war against 
the Taliban.1
Second, DU is a waste product derived from an already existing nuclear 
industry. This makes it accessible and sometimes available to manufacturers at 
little or no cost in the manufacture of armored plating or munitions. The cost of 
artillery shells and other ammunitions produced with DU is about 10% of the cost 
of those weapons manufactured with other metals like tungsten. Furthermore, at 
least 50% of the U.S. tungsten requirement is imported from China at a very high 
cost, while DU costs the weapons manufacturers almost nothing (Tyner 2010, 
149).
The following are some additional reasons for the use of DU weapons. Use 
of DU addresses the problem of increasing quantities of toxic waste from the 
production of nuclear weapons and from nuclear power plants. Furthermore, 
defense companies are able to source materials locally and free of charge, thereby 
reducing the defense budgets in a time of military budget cuts while avoiding 
strategically undesirable dependency on the importation of tungsten. Finally, and 
most importantly, militaries are able to add “superb and innovative” weapons to 
their arsenals (Tyner 2010, 149). Bearing in mind the evidence set forth above, 
one might be right to conclude that the use of DU in the production of weapons 
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presents an overall success for all parties who are involved in the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons, the generation of nuclear power, or in military operations.
However, in using the phrase “overall success for all parties” the meaning is 
restricted to weaponry. A wider judgment is needed on whether the expediency 
of winning wars comes at a far-reaching and, arguably, unacceptable price in 
terms of lingering and accumulative damage to non-combatant human life and 
the environment.
Health and Environmental Implications of the Use of DU
The impact of DU weapons on human health and the natural environment has 
been the subject of extraordinary claims by both parties, those favoring and those 
opposing their use. It has proven difficult to separate fact from fiction, and it is 
now clear that not enough is known about the effects of DU weapons to be able 
to reach a definite conclusion either way. It is perhaps not surprising that this 
subject offers fertile ground for disagreement since the United States and the 
United Kingdom appear to be opposed to further investigation of the health and 
environmental implications of the use of DU weapons (White 2008, 39-47). Such 
political convenience of governments is served by the medical and scientific fact 
that any damaging side effects are slow to materialize and hence, as yet, there is 
little substantial evidence to compel such investigation. 
Nevertheless, the following observations can be made about some of the 
potential health and environmental implications of the use of DU Weapons: 
Figure 1. Various Kinds of DU Rounds from 30 mm to 120 mm
Source: Duff 2011. 
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First, the use of DU in weapons carries the risk of radiation exposure to both 
combatants and non-combatants. Upon impact a DU penetrator quickly oxidizes, 
dispersing toxic uranium oxide dust particles. If, for example, a person were to 
ingest or inhale such particles, these could enter the bloodstream and circulate 
throughout the body, thus exposing the victim to internal radiation.
It is a well-known fact that only about 10 electron volts of energy are 
needed to damage DNA or other body molecules. Since DU is a very powerful 
emitter of alpha particles (up to 4.2 million electron volts per particle), one can 
easily envisage the severe effects of such exposure on military combatants, non-
combatants, and the general public (Ammash 2003, 205, 207). In addition, it 
is also believed that prolonged exposure to internal radiation can cause severe 
health problems, including cancer (especially leukemia, lung, and bone cancer), 
pulmonary and lymph node fibrosis, pneumoconiosis, inhibition of reproductive 
activities, and other life threatening health problems (Ammash 2003, 205-206). 
According to a report by the WHO on the effects of DU on human health 
and the environment following its use by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there is a possibility 
that DU possesses chemical and radiological toxicity which can target two of 
the most important organs of the body: the kidneys and the lungs. However, 
the WHO stressed that the health implications for a specific individual can only 
be determined by the physical and chemical nature, level, and duration of DU 
exposure which a person has experienced. The report went on to state that only 
military use of DU is likely to have substantial impact on an environmental 
scale, but acknowledged that further research is needed to establish the level of 
health and environmental impacts of DU weapons (WHO 2001). Ironically, the 
WHO has been accused of covering up the true impact of DU weapons, as they 
refuse to share evidence that the U.S. use of DU weapons in Iraq contributed to 
an increased number of birth defects in that country (Edwards 2004; Cromwell 
2013).  
Another report from the British Royal Society (BRS) found that there exist 
radiological risks from the use of DU in weapons, but that these risks are very 
minute. At the same time they determined that for the small numbers of soldiers 
who were exposed to DU weapons there might be circumstances in which risks 
could be higher. Like the WHO, the BRS also asserted that for a conclusive 
determination to be made on the real health impact of DU weapons more 
research must be undertaken (McDonald 2001, 323-324).  
Second, DU is not only thought to be damaging to human and animal 
health, but also to the environment, as some of the highly toxic heavy metal 
released by DU is roughly 60% as radioactive as naturally occurring uranium, 
and is said to have a half-life of 4.5 billion years. The implication is that these 
radioactive particles decay extremely slowly and, in effect, can cause permanent 
damage to the environment (Nobuo 2010, 237; Bleise, Danesi, and Burkart 2003, 
116 Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood
102-104).  
In addition, for every 100 DU weapons fired in war only 10 find their 
intended targets, with the remaining 90 penetrating deeply into the earth, 
entering the soil and the water table as they decay. This is certainly dangerous 
for the ecosystem as it becomes impregnated with heavy metals, which are 
consequently a threat to human and other life forms through the food chain 
(Parrish et al. 2008, 68). 
The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), in recognition of 
the effects DU weapons can have on the environment, has stated that heavy 
firing of DU in a concentrated area could increase the potential level of uranium 
contamination of the ground water by a factor of 10 to 100, thus heavily 
contaminating water resources (UNEP 2001). As a result of such danger existing 
in the soil and water table, the WHO has recommended that, where possible, 
cleanup operations should be undertaken in areas where such weapons have 
been used, and in some cases affected areas should be off limits to use by the 
public until the cleanup exercise has taken place (WHO 2001). Despite these 
findings, countries such as the United States and international organizations like 
NATO have continued to use DU weapons in their military and/or humanitarian 
intervention campaigns, without cleanup. Thus, unless the use of DU weapons is 
banned, there is the danger of continuous increase in the number of hibakushas 
in the world2 and endless pollution of our ecosystems (Nobuo 2010, 240). 
There follows in the next section a more detailed review of the struggle for 
transparency as to the legal implications of the use of DU munitions in military 
conflicts.
Military Transparency
James Tyner’s 2010 text Military Legacy: A World Made by War was further 
testament to the fact that certain wars, especially ones that involve the use of 
nuclear weapons or DU munitions, are detrimental not only to the victims 
but also to the victors, as they both suffer the effects of exposure to radiation. 
He argued that, although DU weapons were instrumental to the success of the 
coalition forces in the Gulf War (and also to the subsequent ending of the conflict 
in the Balkans), the victory was marred because within two years of the end of 
the Gulf War veterans, both in the United States and the United Kingdom, began 
to complain of “mysterious” illnesses with symptoms such as weakness, fatigue, 
and respiratory and kidney problems.  
Moreover, children born to veterans of the war were found to exhibit higher 
rates of birth defects and other genetic deformities, and doctors also documented 
increased incidence of cancers and leukemia in such children. These symptoms 
and effects were later termed the “Gulf War Syndrome” (2010, 150). It is 
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noteworthy that the apparent damaging effects of DU munitions are not limited 
to soldiers that have had direct contact with them, but such weapons can also 
have adverse consequences for civilian populations. For example, studies in Iraq 
have shown various forms of cancer in 40-48% of the population in some areas, 
and this abnormally high level has been attributed to the use of DU munitions by 
the coalition forces (Deely 2005, 124). 
However, since there is no single international agreement forbidding the use 
of DU weapons, and because of the alleged lack of conclusive evidence as to the 
effects of DU weapons on veterans, civilians, and the environment, states have 
continued to produce and use these weapons. For example, the U.S. government 
has defended the safety of its use of DU weapons based on their own experiments. 
However, subsequent reports from scientists and experts in the field have shown 
that those studies are inadequate and biased. In 2003, the Nuclear Policy Research 
Institute (NPRI) in Washington, D.C. produced a report suggesting that the U.S. 
government was selective in its conclusions about the real impact of DU weapons. 
The NPRI presented the following evidence: 
First, a 1993 study done by the U.S. General Accounting Office following the 
outbreak of the “Gulf War Syndrome” concluded that “inhaled insoluble oxides 
stay in the lungs longer and pose a potential cancer risk due to radiation.” Second, 
in 1995 another study by the Army Environmental Policy Institute further 
documented the negative health effects of DU weapons, stating that “if DU enters 
the body, it has the potential to generate significant medical consequences; and 
that the risks associated with DU in the body are both chemical and radiological.” 
In addition, the report expressed the view that, notwithstanding such research 
and findings by these government agencies, the U.S. government in their final 
report, entitled “Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ 
Illnesses,” made public in 1996, had made a statement of questionable validity. 
That statement concluded that “it is unlikely that health effects reported by 
Gulf War veterans today are the result of exposure to DU during the Gulf War” 
(Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses 1996, 120). 
If DU weapons have no negative effects on human health and the 
environment—as the reports from producing and using countries suggest—then 
why has the U.S. government made it difficult for further studies to be carried out 
by international agencies to examine the extent of any damage done by the use of 
DU weapons during the Gulf War? Evidence for U.S. resistance to such studies is 
manifested in U.S. lobbying of the UN General Assembly, in November 2001, to 
reject a longstanding proposal from the Iraqi government requesting a detailed 
study on the effects of the use of DU in the Gulf War, notwithstanding that this 
proposal had already been approved by the UN Committee on Disarmament and 
International Security (Nuclear Policy Research Institute 2003, 14). 
Furthermore, in 1995, an article carried by the U.S. Army magazine Armour 
contradicted some of the reassuring reports by the government on the effects 
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of DU on the environment. The article offered advice to military officers living 
or working in DU contaminated environments. For instance, they are to “take 
care to ensure food, shower and bivouac sites are not in an area of known DU 
contamination or where DU dust may have been carried by recent rains…” 
(Paulsen 1995, 34). Surely this advice for soldiers should also apply to civilians, 
and shows there is need for urgent study and prompt decontamination of areas 
where DU weapons have been deployed. 
Likewise, if, as suggested by the producers and users of DU weapons, their 
use has no negative effects on the veterans and the civilian populations exposed 
to them, then there should be alternative explanations, other than the exposure 
to radiation in military conflict, for the deaths of soldiers from different forms of 
cancer after serving in the coalition forces during the Balkan conflict. In fact, the 
linkage between such weapons and disease was recognized when an Italian court 
awarded €500,000 in compensation to the widow of Stefano Melone, a soldier 
who had served as a helicopter pilot in Kosovo, and who had died in 2001 from 
malignant pleuro-pulmonary neoplasia (epithelioid hemangioendothelioma of 
the bone, the lung, and the pleura), a very rare form of cancer which doctors 
attributed to radiation exposure (Albanian Economy News 2008). 
Similarly, if the use of DU weapons were of no threat to the environment, 
then there would have been no need for the British government to offer, in April 
2003, to help with the clean-up of such munitions that were used by the coalition 
forces in Iraq (Kirby 2003). 
Legal Perspectives
Regrettably, no treaty has so far been enacted that makes it specifically illegal for 
DU munitions to be used in armed conflict; neither is there any treaty limiting 
their use in military intervention. Due to their characteristics, there may be 
legal grounds for prohibiting the use of DU weapons, or at least for having 
their use limited under existing laws overseeing other weaponry. DU is both 
radiologically and chemically toxic; therefore, the closest analogous weapons in 
terms of their health and environmental effects would be nuclear or chemical 
weapons. According to the UN General Assembly in its 1961 Declaration on the 
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons: “[A]ny State 
using nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the 
Charter of the UN, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing 
a crime against mankind and civilization” (Hulme 2005, 233-234).3 
Furthermore, the 1963 Treaty on Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the 
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, signed by the United States and 
the United Kingdom among others, expressed states’ desire to “put an end to the 
contamination of man’s environment by radioactive substances” (Hulme 2005, 
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238). This mandate was repeated in the nuclear free zone treaties for the South 
Pacific, African, and Southeast Asian regions, which declared that the regions 
should be kept “free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other 
radioactive matter.”
The use of DU munitions by state parties appears to be in clear violation 
of the objectives of these treaties and declaration. But as Hulme notes, because 
they refer only to the use of nuclear weapons and contain no specific mention 
of DU weapons (which, as we have seen above, are radioactive but not nuclear), 
there seems to be an inadequate legal framework within which to hold both the 
producers and users of such weapons accountable for their alleged violations of 
humanity and the planet.  
Similarly, DU weapons are comparable to chemical weapons as both types 
of weapons have chemically toxic effects. It is important to note that chemical 
weapons have a longer battle history than nuclear weapons and, as a result 
of their devastating effects, their use is “completely banned” under the 1993 
Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, and governs procedures for their 
destruction. However, based on what constitutes a toxic material under the 
Convention, regrettably, DU is not classified as a toxic chemical and as a result 
does not fall within the criteria for prohibition (Hulme 2005, 238, 241, 243). It 
will be seen, therefore, that there is no international treaty prohibiting the use of 
DU munitions despite the reports setting forth evidence of the damaging effects 
of their use in the Gulf region and elsewhere.  
These weapons were deployed by the coalition forces under NATO’s authority 
in Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo between 1994 and 1999, and subsequently in the 
military campaign by both the U.S. and the UK governments in Iraq in 2003. 
More recently, according to the International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons 
(ICBUW), leaked transport documents suggest that DU weapons have also been 
deployed by U.S. forces in Afghanistan (ICBUW 2007). There is also increasing 
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speculation that DU weapons were utilized by both the U.S. and NATO forces 
during the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya (Gelling 2011).  
Use of DU Weapons in the Balkans
In order to understand more clearly the possible implications of the use of DU 
weapons, a closer examination of their use in the Balkans by NATO and its 
coalition forces between 1994 and 1999 is valuable. It is worth noting that by the 
time of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, there already existed significant international 
interest in both the use and after-effects of DU munitions. As we have seen, this 
interest was mainly a result of claims made about the military effectiveness of 
their deployment in the Gulf War of 1991, and illnesses subsequently suffered by 
some of the veterans who took part in that war. Concern about the health effects 
was overwhelming, so much so that two months after the end of the military 
campaign in Kosovo, and long before the exact quantities and locations of DU 
weapons had been identified by scientists from international organizations, Roger 
Coghill, a British scientist, claimed that “America’s use of DU weapons in the war 
with Serbia is likely to cause 10,000 extra deaths from cancer” (Kirby 1999).
Moreover, according to UNEP, following its sampling of sites in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 2002, “If there is widespread measurable contamination of the 
ground surface by DU, there is a risk that some DU will become airborne through 
wind action and subsequently be inhaled by people. There is also a possibility of 
contamination of food (fruit, vegetables, meat, etc.) and drinking water” (UNEP 
2003, 19). In line with this risk of exposure by inhalation, Hulme, in her book, 
War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold, explains further that 
the dust created when DU munitions are fired usually consists of both soluble 
and insoluble particles, and the soluble uranium substance if inhaled as either 
fume or gas is absorbed into the bloodstream. Although most of these impurities 
will be excreted from the body relatively quickly, there are still risks that severe 
damage can be caused to the kidneys given their function as the body’s filter, and 
so it is in these organs that most chemical components of the inhaled dust would 
accumulate (Hulme 2004, 229). She went on to state that, contrary to the reports 
by some agencies on the lasting extent of the damage of soluble uranium to the 
kidneys, other government scientists have stated that such kidney damage is 
likely to be reversible. 
The insoluble uranium particles created on the impact of DU weapons, on 
the other hand, do not dissolve in the bloodstream and circulate in the body and 
hence exhibit low chemical toxicity to the body as a whole. However, by their 
nature the particles are likely to settle in the first organ contacted: the lungs, if 
inhaled; the stomach, if ingested; or under the skin, if embedded in a wound. 
Such insoluble dust can cause localized radiation damage to the organs in which 
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it lodges as a result of the presence of alpha particles. For example, if insoluble 
uranium material is inhaled and retained in the body for too long, it can cause 
damage to lung tissue (Hulme 2004, 229-230). It is important to note that other 
government and international sources, including NATO, have consistently stated 
that the effects of DU on human health and the environment set forth in scientific 
findings such as the ones cited by Hulme are “negligible” (NATO 2001).  
Regarding the effects of the use of DU weapons on the environment, 
tests carried out by UNEP (2003, 32) in Bosnia and Herzegovina found 
localized ground contamination around the site of impact with widely variable 
concentrations: 0.01-100g DU/kg of soil. One of their most important findings 
was related to the dispersion of soil contamination over time. In the five years 
since impact, the detectable dispersion depth had reached 10 to 40 cm, compared 
to the Kosovo findings of a depth of only 0 to 10 cm.  
Results such as those set forth above have caused bodies such as the WHO to 
remain concerned about the continued use of DU munitions, and the European 
Parliament has gone a step further by calling for a halt to the use of any form of 
DU weapons until their effects have been conclusively assessed (ICBUW 2008). 
Conclusion
The principal findings of this research note may be summarized as follows: DU 
weapons were first used by the American and British forces in the 1991 Gulf War 
and have been used subsequently in several theaters of action. They are cheap to 
produce and highly effective militarily. They are made from uranium waste, and 
therefore they contain chemically toxic and radioactive compounds. There is a 
widespread concern as to the lasting damage that may be caused by the use of DU 
weapons to human life and the environment. Therefore, this note suggests that 
there are a number of inter-related factors that need to be considered.
The military, strategic, and cost-effective benefits of DU weapons are 
undeniable and present compelling reasons for the U.S. and UK governments and 
NATO to continue to favor their use and to play down any lasting and damaging 
effects. Similarly, control of the use of such weapons is difficult because, although 
some research has been done, it is so far considered insufficient (given the 
delayed effects on health and the environment). It is probably too early to provide 
definitive scientific proof as to the damage caused by DU weapons on combatants, 
non-combatants, and the environment, despite the availability of some harrowing 
case reports. 
In addition, DU weapons, although both radioactive and toxic, are not 
nuclear. They therefore do not fall within the UN’s definition of chemical weapons 
and, as such, there exists no clear legal framework banning their use. Based 
on the evidence presented and the arguments for and against the health and 
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environmental implications of the use of DU weapons, it is clear that the signing 
of a treaty banning the use of DU weapons would currently be very difficult to 
achieve.   
Given this impasse, what does the future hold? The response to this 
question lies in understanding, first, that it is probable that the U.S. and British 
governments will continue to claim that DU is relatively harmless—a position 
which is, at best, the result of only a small number of studies together with 
inaccurate interpretation of such limited information available to them and, at 
worst, a continuing culture of non-disclosure.
Second, unless and until such evidence becomes available, it will be difficult 
to implement any form of ban on the production, possession, trade, and use of 
DU weapons. Dekker added that one of the possible reasons why the use of DU 
weapons may be difficult to ban is “due to the near impossibility of supervision of 
compliance” (2008, 92). 
Third, while working toward a ban on these weapons, there is a need for a 
set of transparency measures regarding DU munitions to be established amongst 
producers and users, bearing in mind that this measure should not in any way 
serve as a substitute for a treaty prohibiting their use (Fahey 2008b, 72; Dekker 
2008, 97). Most importantly, as recommended by the WHO, cleanup exercises 
should be carried out, particularly in heavily contaminated areas, to reduce the 
possible effects of DU exposure. 
Finally, as evidence accumulates it seems appropriate to look ahead with 
optimism to a time when the use of DU in warfare will be either prohibited 
or limited, based on the principles of Article 35 (2) of the Geneva Protocol I, 
which states that “it is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and materials 
and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering” (Hulme 2005, 245-246).
Notes
1. The use of DU weapons in Afghanistan has not been confirmed; however, evidence of 
the transportation of such weapons in the region has been uncovered (ICBUW 2007).
2. The term of hibakusha was first used to describe the survivors of A-bomb radiation 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but is now used generally to describe any victims of atomic 
radiation.
3. It is noteworthy that unlike treaties, declarations are not legally binding in 
international law; as such it is impossible to hold states accountable for not adhering to it 
(Dixon et al. 2011, 51-52).
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